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THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE: WHY ANOTHER IGC? 
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union was the first in the history of the Union to create a 
procedure for its own revision. At the time it was being negotiated, Europe was in the grip of a 
vortex of change and none could be sure that the Union would be adequately adapted to deal with 
those changes, particularly in the areas of foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs 
which occupied important places in the Treaty. 
Since then, the need for review has been strengthened by the much more definitive assurances 
about membership which the Union has given to the countries of central and eastern Europe, as 
well as Cyprus and Malta. The Union may number 25 Member States within the next decade 
which may mean major reforms of the institutions and their procedures. 
The issues to be examined according to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union 
The Treaty indicates that the main issues should be: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
whether decisions are being taken as closely as possible to the citizen 
whether the internal market is succeeding in promoting balanced economic and social 
progress 
whether the provisions on Common Foreign and Security Policy should be revised 
whether the rights and interests of citizens are being protected 
whether cooperation is developing effectively on justice and home affairs 
whether the Council of Ministers should share more legislative powers with the European 
Parliament 
whether the competencies of the Union should be extended to include energy, civil 
protection and tourism 
This list is by no means exclusive. As can be seen from the annex, the Treaty allows virtually any 
issue to be raised which relates to the Union's objectives. Since it was signed in February 1992, 
the prospect of the enlargement of the Union prompted the European Council to add a number of 
other items to the IGC's agenda: 
* 
* 
* 
should there be a limit on the number of European Commissioners and if so, on what basis 
should they be appointed 
the extent of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and the weighting of votes 
measures to make the institutions work better. 
The Reflection Group 
The European Council meeting in Essen in December 1994 called for the formation of a Reflection 
Group to prepare for the IGC. It was to be made up of representatives of foreign ministers, the 
structures to an architecture that was already far from simple. Some complications derive from the 
fact that the Treaty created a structure based on three pillars: 
Pillar One - founded the Union on the established Community institutions and procedures with the 
Commission, the Council, the Parliament and the Court of Justice playing their recognised roles 
Pillar Two - provides for a Common Foreign and Security Policy essentially based on 
intergovernmental cooperation with limited roles for the Commission and the Parliament 
Pillar Three - provides for cooperation on justice and home affairs on a similarly 
intergovernmental basis 
Agreed goals, differing approaches 
The generally agreed goals of the 1996 IGC are to bring more effectiveness, coherence and 
democratic accountability to the workings of the Union. Among other things, this means 
simplifying procedures, clarifying responsibilities and bringing more transparency and democracy to 
the decision-making processes. 
However, Member States will be bringing contrasting approaches to the search for these objectives. 
Many wish to see further progress towards deepening the Community by means of more majority 
voting in the Council, more powers to the European Parliament and stronger roles for the 
Commission and Parliament in developing the CFSP. 
Others, however, believe that the integration process has now gone far enough and that further 
deepening would require unacceptable transfers of sovereignty from the Member States. Its 
members want to preserve and expand the intergovernmental spheres of action and possibly even 
transfer some areas of competence which currently belong to the Union back to national 
governments. 
So the debate in the IGC will be shaped by the principles of effectiveness, coherence and 
democratic accountability as well as by the contrasting attitudes of federalism and 
in tergovernmentalism. 
The main issues 
It is still too early to clearly identify all of the issues which will feature on the agenda of the IGC. 
However, declarations by both the European Council and the Council of Ministers indicate that 
institutional questions will be particularly prominent including: 
* voting systems in the Council of Ministers (the size of blocking minorities, weighting 
votes in proportion to size of population, extending the scope of qualified majority voting). As far 
as decision-making procedures are concerned, there may be plenty of scope to simplify the process 
involving the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. At the moment, there are more than 20 
different ways of arriving at a decision 
* the size of the Commission. There are now 20 Commissioners and there would be 38 in a 
Union of 25 members. The search for a more effective Commission leads many to agree with the 
former President, Jacques Delors, that the number of Commissioners should be reduced. This 
would break the system under which smaller Member States are entitled to one Commissioner and 
larger ones, two 
* powers of the European Parliament. Should an extension of majority voting in the 
Council be accompanied by an enlargement of the Parliament's powers of co-decision - a possibility 
explicitly referred to in the Maastricht Treaty - so as to strengthen democratic accountability? 
Could the Commission's accountability to the Parliament be strengthened if its next President was 
elected by the Parliament from a list drawn up by the European Council, as President Santer has 
suggested 
* justice and home affairs. Do the procedures and machinery for intergovernmental 
consultation need simplifying in order to speed-up decision-making? 
Other issues 
* foreign and security policy. It is widely recognised that lack of political will is largely 
responsible for the relatively meagre progress in applying the Maastricht Treaty's provisions in this 
area. However, there is likely to be some discussion at the JGC of more majority voting on 
decisions which implement unanimously agreed common positions. 
* defence. The end of the Cold War and the need to revise the Treaty of Brussels (the 
founding Treaty of the Western European Union) in 1998 raises the question as to whether defence 
and the WEU should be formally incorporated into the structure of the European Union. 
* subsidiarity and simplification of procedures. Member states will want to review the 
working of the subsidiarity principle which decrees that in those areas for which the Union does not 
have exclusive competence, the responsibility for action should lie with the Member States unless 
they cannot "sufficiently achieve" the objectives. Subsidiarity concerns above all the exercise of 
powers, not their allocation, which is determined by the Treaty. Implicit in the Treaty is the 
principle that national powers are the rule and the Community's the exception. 
PARTICIPANTS IN THE REFLECTION GROUP 
President: 
Spain: Carlos WESTENDORP, Secretary of State for Relations with the European Communities 
Austria: Manfred SCHEICH, Permanent Representative 
Belgium: Erik DERYCKE, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development 
Denmark: Niels ERSBOELL, former Secretary General of the EU's Council of Ministers 
Finland: Ingvar MELIN, former Defence Minister 
France: Michel BARNIER, Minister for European Affairs 
Germany: Werner HOYER, Minister of State for European Affairs 
Greece: Stephanos STATHATOS, former Ambassador to London, Paris and Brussels 
Ireland: Gay MITCHELL, Minister of State for European Affairs 
Italy: Silvio FAGIOLO, formerly Deputy Ambassador to Washingon 
Luxembourg: Joseph WEYLAND, Ambassador to London 
Netherlands: Michie! PA TUN, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
Portugal: Andre GONZAL VES PEREIRA, former Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Sweden: Lund GUNNAR, Under Secretary for Trade 
United Kingdom: David DAVIS, Minister for European Affairs 
European Commission: Marcelino OREJA, Commissioner for Institutional Affairs 
European Parliament: Elisabeth GUIGOU (Socialist Group) and Elmar BROK (European 
Peoples' Party). 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCES: AN OVERVIEW 
Once very rare indeed, the Intergovernmental Conference (JGC) has become a surprisingly 
frequent event on the European Union's political calendar. The JGC of 1996 will be the fourth in 
eleven years, but only the sixth in the Union's 45-year history. All of its predecessors have 
marked crucial advances in the European construction. 
Their growing regularity is vital testimony to the pressures for change which have been, and 
continue to crowd in on the Union. Pragmatically, but with determination, the three in the last 
decade have tried to respond to these pressures with a mix of institutional reforms, changes in 
procedures and the addition of new competences and forms of cooperation. 
Obviously, the JGC process is not an invention of the Union - it is as old as the relationships 
between sovereign powers. With the growth of global interdependence, intergovernmental 
conferences have been seeking multilateral solutions to problems in such areas as the 
environment, aid programmes and international trade. They have resulted in agreements and 
Treaties between sovereign nations which expand the frontiers of international cooperation, and 
frequently deepen it. 
Within the Union, however, the JGC process has acquired a more general importance. IGCs do 
not directly develop the specific content of policies - as might, for example, an international 
agreement limiting pollutants - but they do alter the legal and institutional framework and the 
procedures by which policy agreements are made between Member States. The two IGCs of the 
1950s were exercises in political construction based on the writing of new Treaties. The three 
most recent, were involved in adding to the existing Treaties and in amending them. 
Characteristics of an IGC 
An JGC is, by definition, a negotiation between governments outside of the framework of the 
Union's procedures and institutions. Each has its own particular flavour and qualities, but they all 
share important similarities: 
* their negotiations are usually shaped by a previously-prepared reports and recommendations 
* most of the detailed work is done by expert officials under the guidance and coordination of the 
Council of Ministers (1985 and 1990-91 ). In 1991, the final terms were determined by the 
European Council 
* all have succeeded in achieving their fundamental objectives 
Laying the Foundation Stone - The 1950-51 Intergovernmental Conference 
This was the founding moment in the Union's history. The IGC, which began in May 1950, 
brought together France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries under the chairmanship of 
Jean Monnet. Other participants included Walter Hallstein, who led the German delegation and 
was subsequently an oustanding President of the Commission, and for the Dutch delegation, Dirk 
Spierenberg, later a prominent public servant in European affairs. 
Negotiations were based on the Schuman Plan - the proposal for placing Franco-German coal and 
steel production, and that of other nations that wished to join, under a common High Authority. 
The Treaty of Paris of April 1951 placed the Coal and Steel Community under the control of a 
High Authority which was made answerable to an Assembly with powers to dismiss it. Its actions 
could be legally challenged at a European Court of Justice. 
Essentially, this institutional model was to be adopted for the European Economic Community at 
the second IGC. 
Building Europe - 1955-57 Intergovernmental Conference 
After the foreign ministers of the Six had launched the IGC at Messina in April 1955, a project 
group was set up under Paul-Henri Spaak which reported in favour of creating a common market 
for all goods and services based on a customs union with a common external tariff. It also 
proposed a union in the field of nuclear energy. The report was approved by Foreign Ministers at 
Venice in May and negotiations between officials began shortly afterwards at the Chateau Val 
Duchesse in Brussels. 
In March 1957, the Six signed the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The institutions of these 
two Communities were merged with the ECSC in 1965. 
From the outset, the EEC shared the same Parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice with the 
ECSC but its High Authority, the Commission, had less authority over member governments. 
A long interlude 
Twenty seven years were to elapse after the launch of the EEC before Member States were again 
to resort to an IGC in search of a response to new challenges. Why was this? Some historians 
say there was a decline in the federalist impulse which had led to the creation of the ECSC and the 
EEC. Others put the blame squarely on the economic difficulties created by oil price shocks 
which pushed inflation and unemployment up and political confidence down. 
Certainly, attempts were made in the early 1970s to set the Community on a path to economic 
and political union after its enlargement to include Britain, Denmark and Ireland in 1973. But 
these were not based on any use of the IGC and were nullified by economic crisis and political 
weakness. At the same time, a new and transparently intergovernmental element was introduced 
into Community decision-making in 197 4 with the first meeting of the European Council. 
Originally conceived by the then French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing as an opportunity for 
intimate and informal discussion and agreement between heads of state and government, the 
European Council swiftly filled a void in Community decision-making. It became the locus of 
discussion and negotiation on issues which the Council of Ministers was unable to resolve. From 
that point, it was only a small step for the European Council to assume its modem strategy-setting 
role, not only for internal policies but also in determining common positions on key issues of 
foreign policy. 
The 1980s turning point 
During the first half of the 1980s, however, new external and internal pressures were 
strengthening demands for reforms which prompted most member states to think in terms of 
reviving the IGC mechanism. Internal demands for change were generated by widespread 
dissatisfaction with the working of the Community and anxieties that Europe was steadily falling 
behind the US and Japan in economic performance and technological development. Economic 
weakness was attributed by many to fragmentation of the Community's market by non-tariff 
barriers. 
Many blamed this lack of dynamism on a reassertion of national power at the expense of the 
Community's institutions and procedures. This view was particularly rooted in the European 
Parliament which had been directly elected since 1979. In 1984, the Parliament adopted the Draft 
Treaty of European Union, inspired by the mercurial, grey-bearded Altiero Spinelli, an Italian 
radical and former Commisioner. 
The Draft's proposal for a federal reform of the Community institutions appeared to many to be 
too federalist for its time. Nevertheless after the European Council had responded by setting up 
an ad hoe committee, this committee (headed by the Irish Senator James Dooge) produced a 
report in favour of institutional reform which found much to commend in the Parliament's draft. 
Meanwhile, the new Commission headed by Jacques Delors produced its recipe for galvanising 
the Community's economy: the White Paper, Completing the Internal Market, which set out a 
detailed timetable for enacting nearly 300 measures to remove non-tariff barriers by the end of 
1992. 
But if this was the remedy for economic weakness, it could only be applied by attacking the 
sclerosis which was steadily invading the Community's decision-making process. At the European 
Council in Milan in June 1985, the heads of government approved the Commission's White Paper 
on the internal market and also decided, by an unprecedented majority vote, to set up an IGC to 
consider insititutional reform. 
Relaunching Europe - the 1985 IGC 
The Dooge Report and the Single Market White Paper were working papers for this JGC. The 
political objective was to agree a package of reforms which would guarantee fulfillment of the 
1992 programme. In reviving the JGC mechanism, governments could now draw upon nearly 30 
years of experience of working together to use it to best advantage. 
Most of them fielded their Permanent Representatives as chief negotiators. These all had 
immense knowledge of the Community's polices and practices and knew each other well from 
their weekly encounters in the Committee of Permanent Representatives. As members of an 
exclusive club with well-established conventions and a high level of personal trust between many 
of its members, they knew how to negotiate to agreement. This IGC reached a rapid conclusion 
in less than four months between September and December. 
The trophy presented to the European Council was the Single European Act, a series of treaty 
amendments which at the time disappointed those who were looking for a federalist leap forward. 
Subsequent experience revealed, however, that the Single Act enabled the Community to make 
very significant progress. 
It committed the Member States to completing the internal market by 1992, made this possible by 
a significant extension of majority voting, developed the Community's powers in economic and 
social fields, enhanced the role of the European Parliament and formalised cooperation in foreign 
policy and the existence of the European Council - neither of which had previously featured in the 
Treaties. 
Towards Economic and Monetary Union - the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conferences 
As it became clear that Member States had the political will and, thanks to the Single Act, the 
procedural flexibility needed to achieve the single market, attention swiftly turned towards the 
question of a single currency. Jacques Delors, the Commission President, shared the view of 
many influential economists that free movement of capital goods and services was not compatible 
with nationally determined monetary policies. 
They believed that the European Monetary System was too fragile an arrangement to survive this 
anomaly, and that it could be severely damaged if economic and monetary policies were not 
unified - a conviction that was vindicated by the currency storms of September 1992. 
In June 1988, the European Council set up a committee, chaired by Delors, to produce proposals 
for an economic and monetary union. The Committee reported in April 1989 and explicitly drew 
attention to the transfer of powers to the Union which would be necessary as well as the 
institutional changes. In December of that year, the European Council decided to call an JGC to 
prepare the necessary Treaty revisions for a complete economic and monetary union. 
The sudden collapse of the Soviet empire in eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany in 
October 1990 led both France and Germany to seek closer political integration of the 
Community. The European Council of June 1990 adopted the proposal of Chancellor Kohl and 
President Mitterrand that an JGC on political union be held in parallel with that on monetary 
union. Both were formally launched by the European Council in Rome in December 1990 and 
resulted in the Treaty on European Union, agreed by the European Council at Maastricht in 
December 1991. 
One IGC will lead to another 
The IGC on economic and monetary union was comprised mainly of officials from national 
Treasuries and Finance Ministries. As did all previous IGCs it had a seminal report to draw upon 
- the Delors report - and also a great deal of preparatory work that had been carried out by 
governors of the Community's central banks. The result was a structured design for EMU based 
on a single currency, a European Central Bank and a phased programme for establishing them by 
1997 or at the latest by 1999. 
Most Member States again deployed their permanent representatives in Brussels for the IGC on 
political union - France, Denmark and Italy were the only exceptions. The result of their labours 
was more complicated - stronger powers for the European Parliament, a modest extension of 
Community competences and of majority voting into areas of social policy, counterbalanced by 
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs on a largely intergovernmental basis. 
Modest steps were designed towards the construction of a common foreign and security policy in 
a system which is more intergovernmental than that of the Union, although the Commission and 
Parliament do play a part and there is an opening for the use of majority voting. 
The Treaty on European Union, which amends the other Treaties but does not replace them, is the 
first to schedule a subsequent IGC to review its working. This is to be launched in 1996 with 
preparations opening, symbolically, with a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Messina on the 40th 
anniversary of that historic conference which laid the path to the Treaty of Rome. 
I • 
INTER GOVERNMENT AL CONFERENCES 1950-95 
1950-51: 
resulting in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
1955-57: 
resulting in the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the European 
Atomic Energy Community 
1985: 
resulting in the Single European Act 
1990-91: 
two IGCs resulting in the Treaty of European Union 
WHAT THE TREATY SAYS ABOUT THE JGC 
The Treaty's concern is that the IGC should examine how effectively the Union's mechanisms and 
institutions are achieving the objectives set out in Articles A and B: 
Objective of Article A 
* whether decisions are being taken as closely as possible to the citizen 
Objectives of Article B 
* promoting economic progress through the internal market 
* strengthening economic and social cohesion 
* establishing Economic and Monetary Union and a single currency 
* implementing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and eventually framing a common defence 
policy possibly leading to a common defence 
* protecting rights and interests of citizens through Union citizenship - developing close 
cooperation on justice and home affairs. 
All of these objectives to be achieved while respecting the principle of subsidiarity (Article B). 
The Treaty also states that the scope of the co-decision procedure involving the Council and the 
Parliament may be widened (Article 189 (b)), that the CFSP provisions may be revised, bearing in 
mind the expiration in 1998 of the Brussels Treaty establishing the Western European Union 
(Article J.4). 
Two declarations call for an examination of the possible extension of Community competency to 
include energy, civil protection and tourism (1st Declaration) and for an examination of the 
reclassification of Community acts to establish a legal hierarchy between different categories of 
actions. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF REPORTS 
Most IGCs have been shaped by a key report: 
* in 1950: the Schumann Plan 
* in 1955: the Spaak Report 
* in 1985: the Dooge Report and the Single Market White Paper 
* in 1990-91: the Delors Report on Economic and Monetary Union 
